In this paper, general logic-systems and a necessary and sufficient algorithm AG are used to substantiate significant consequence operator properties. It is shown, among other results, that, in certain cases, (1) if the number of steps in a deduction is restricted, then such deduction does not yield a consequence operator. (2) In general, for any non-organized infinite language L, there is a special class of finite consequence operators that is not meet-complete. (3) For classical deduction, three different examples of modified propositional deduction yield collections of finite consequence operators that are not meet-complete. In a final section, the notion of potentially finite is investigated.
Introduction.
In order to avoid an ambiguous definition for the "finite consequence operator," it is assumed that a language L is a nonempty set within informal set-theory. The term finite means that A ⊂ L is finite iff A = ∅ or there exists a bijection f : A → [1, n] = {x | (1 ≤ x ≤ n) ∧ (n ∈ IN)}, where IN is the set of all natural numbers including zero. It is always assumed that A is finite iff A is Dedekind-finite. Finite always implies, in ZF, Dedekind-finite. There is a model η for ZF that contains a set that is infinite and Dedekind-finite (Jech, 1971, pp. 116-118) . On the other hand, for any model of ZF, if A is well-ordered or denumerable, then any B ⊂ A is finite iff B is Dedekind-finite. In all cases, if the Axiom of Choice (AC) is adjoined to the ZF axioms, finite is equivalent to Dedekind-infinite. In consequence operator theory, there may be certain results where the informal set theory used does require the informal axiom of choice.
Since Tarski's introduction of consequence operator (Tarski, 1956) , although he mentions that it is not required for certain investigations, a language L upon which such operators are defined has been assumed to have, at the least, a certain amount of structure. For example, without further consideration it has been assumed that L can, at least, be considered as a free monoid, with an externally defined unit. Indeed, such structures have become "self-evident" hypotheses. In order to emphasize that such special structures should not be assumed, the term "non-organized" is introduced . This term is used to emphasize that no other independent structural properties should be assumed. Formally, a non-organized language L, is a language where only hypothesized properties P 1 , P 2 , . . . ,informal set theory or, if necessary, informal set theory and an axiom of choice are used to deduce conclusions. Hence, all other independent properties L might possess are ignored. This is, of course, the usual meaning of deducing conclusions from a set of hypotheses. The term "non-organized" is only used as a means to stress this standard methodology.
Logic-Systems.
In Herrmann (2001) , the notion of a logic-system is discussed and an algorithm described. The algorithm is repeated here since it will be applied to most of the examples. In this and the following paragraph, the algorithm AG that determines a general logic-systems is defined. The process is exactly the same as used in formal logic except for the use of the RI(L) as defined below. Informally, the pre-axioms is a nonempty A ⊂ L. The set of pre-axioms may contain any logical axiom and, in order not to include them with every set of hypotheses, A can contain other entities N ⊂ L that are consider as "Theory Axioms" such as natural laws. A finite rules of inference is a fixed finite set RI(L) = {R 1 , . . . , R p } of n-ary relations (n ≥ 1) on L. (Note: RI(L) can be empty.) The pre-axioms are considered as a unary relation in RI(L). An infinite rules of inference is a fixed infinite set RI(L) of n-ary relations on L. A general rules of inference is a finite or infinite set of rules of inference. The term "fixed" means that no member of RI(L) is altered by any set X of hypotheses that are used as discussed below. Usually, some of these R i are N dependent. This means, in this case, that various members of N are incorporated within some of the n-ary relations, where n > 1. It is always assumed that an activity called deduction from a set of hypotheses can be represented by a finite (partial) sequence of numbered (in order) steps {b 1 , . . . , b m } with the final step b m a consequence (result) of the deduction. Also, b m is said to be "deduced" from X. All of these steps are considered as represented by objects from the language L. Any such deduction is composed either of the zero step, indicating that there are no steps in the sequence, or one or more steps with the last numbered step being some m > 0. In this inductive step-by-step construction, a basic rule used to construct a deduction is the insertion rule. If the construction is at the step number m ≥ 0, then the insertion rule, I, can be applied. This rule states: Insertion of a hypothesis (premise) from X ⊂ L, or insertion of a member from the set A, or the insertion of any member of any other unary relation can be made and this insertion is denoting by the next step number. Having more than one unary relation is often very convenient in locating particular types of insertions. The pre-axioms are often partitioned into, at the least, two unary relations. It is the insertion rule that allows for deductions from a set of hypotheses X ⊂ L. If the construction is at the step number m > 0, then RI(L) allows for an additional insertion of a member from L as a step number m + 1, in the following manner. For any (j + 1)-ary R i , j > 1, if f ∈ R i and f (k) ∈ {b 1 , . . . , b m }, k = 1, . . . , j, then f (j + 1) can be inserted as a step number m + 1. In terms of the Frege (1879), Kleene (1934) and Rosser (1935) notation ⊢ (i.e. X ⊢ x signifies that x is obtained from X be means of a deduction from X) it follows from the above defined process that if X ⊢ b, then there is either a nonempty finite F = {b 1 , . . . , b k } ⊂ X such that F ⊢ b or, if F = ∅, then the b is obtained by insertion of members from any unary relation, or such an insertion and application of the other n-ary (n > 1) rules of inference. Hence, this algorithm yields the same "deduction from hypotheses" transitive property, as does formal logic, in that X ⊢ Y ⊂ L and Y ⊢ Z ⊂ L imply that X ⊢ Z.
Note the possible existence of special binary relations J that can be members of various RI(L). These relations are identity styled relations in that the first and second coordinates are identical. In scientific theory building, these are used to indicate that a particular set of natural laws or processes does not alter a particular premise that describes a natural-system characteristic. The characteristic represented by this premise remains part of the final conclusion. Scientifically this can be a significant fact. These J relations are significant for the extended realism relation (Herrmann, 2001) . The deduction is constructed only from the rule of insertion or the rules of inference as described in this and the previous paragraph. This concludes the definition of the AG algorithm.
For L, X ⊂ L, general logic-system RI(L), and an application of AG, the notation RI(L) ⇒ C means that the set map C: P(L) → P(L) is defined by letting
The following "obvious" result is established here not because its "proof" is complex, but, rather due to its significance. Moreover, in Herrmann (2001) , it is established in a slightly different manner and the result as stated there is not raised to the level of a numbered theorem.
Theorem 2.1 Given L, a fixed general rules of inference RI(L) and that the general logic-system algorithm AG is applied. If RI(L) ⇒ C, then C is a finite consequence operator.
Proof. Let C: P(L) → P(L) be defined by applications of the general logicsystem algorithm AG to X using a general rules of inference RI(L). Let x ∈ X. By insertion {x} ⊢ x. Hence, X ⊂ C(X). If X ⊂ Y ⊂ L and x ∈ C(X), then there is a finite F ⊂ X such that F ⊢ x and F ⊂ Y. Hence, x ∈ C(Y ). Consequently, C(X) ⊂ C(Y ). Let x ∈ C(C(X)). From the definition of C, (1) X ⊢ y iff y ∈ C(X). By the transitive property for ⊢, C(X) ⊢ C(C(X)) implies X ⊢ C(C(X)), and (1) still holds. Hence, C(C(X)) ⊂ C(X). Therefore, C(X) = C(C(X)) and C is a general consequence operator. Let x ∈ C(X). Then, as before, there is a finite
Let C f (L) be the set of all finite consequence operators defined on P(L). Each C ∈ C f (L) defines a specific RI * (C) such that RI * (C) ⇒ C * = C . However, in general, RI(L) = RI * (C).
Let C(L) be the set of all general consequence operators defined on P(L). Define on C(L) a partial order ≤ as follows: for C 1 , C 2 ∈ C(L), C 1 ≤ C 2 iff for each X ⊂ L, C 1 (X) ⊂ C 2 (X). The structure C(L), ≤ is a complete lattice. The meet, ∧, is defined as follows: C 1 ∧ C 2 = C 3 , where for each X ⊂ L, C 3 (X) = C 1 (X) ∩ C 2 (X). Clearly, for any nonempty H ⊂ C(L), H means that for any
The join for this lattice is not the corresponding ∪ set-theoretic operator except for certain collections of consequence operators. Lemma 2.7 in Herrmann (2004) shows that if nonempty B ⊂ P(L) (this corrects a typographical error at this point in the statement of lemma 2.7) and for every X ⊂ L, there exists a Y ∈ B such that X ⊂ Y , then the set map defined by
The set of all consequence operators defined on P(L) forms a complete lattice C(L), ∧, ∨ w , I, U with lower unit I, the identity map, and upper unit U, Herrmann (2004) , that C f (L), ∧, ∨ w , I, U is join-complete as a sublattice.
Relative to the operator ∪, it is shown in by logic-systems that for any L with 5 elements, the set C f (L) is not closed under the ∪ operator. That is, there are two very simple finite logic-system generated consequence operators
is not a general consequence operator. Hence, if combined deduction is defined by ∨, it does not follow the usual deductive procedures used through out mathematics and the physical sciences. There is a constraint that can be placed on deduction from hypotheses using algorithm AG. In every case, there is a RI(L) that if the restricted RI(L) ⇒ D, then D is not a general consequence operator.
Example 2.2. (Limiting the number of steps in a deduction.) Suppose that the algorithm AG has the added restriction that no deduction from hypotheses be longer then n steps, where n > 1. For any L, such that |L| ≥ n + 1 if L is finite, let L ⊃ {x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , a, b}, and RI(L) = {{(x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , a)}, {(a, b)}}. Let ⊢ ≤n indicate that any deduction from premises most have n or fewer steps. Then, using this restriction,
This follows since the definition requires that you calculate in no more than n steps all of the consequences of {x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , a} using any finite subset of {x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , a}. Thus, D 2 = D. Let P R be a standard predicate language (Mendelson, 1987, pp. 55-56) , where P R has more than one predicate with one or more arguments and with the set of variables V. Let R 1 be the set of all axioms,
If you restrict predicate deduction to 3 steps or less, then restricted RI(P R) ⇒ C P and C p is not a general consequence operator.
Special Consequence Operators.
In Herrmann (1987) , two significant collections of consequence operators are discussed. Let X, Y ⊂ L. (1) Define the set map C(X, Y ): P(L) → P(L) as follows:
(2) Define the set map C ′ (X, Y ): P(L) → P(L) as follows: for A ∈ P(L) and
In some cases, the use of logic-systems can lead to rather short proofs for consequence operator properties, where other methods require substantial effort.
Example 3.1 (Establishing that some general consequence operators are finite.)
is not a finite consequence operator.
Of course, C ′ (X, H) is not the usual type of consequence operator one would associate with a propositional language. The question is are there simple finite consequence operators associated with standard formal propositional deduction that are not meet-complete?
Relative to a standard propositional language L, after some extensive analysis and using the Loś and Suszko matrix theorem, Wójcicki (1973) defines a collection of k-valued matrix generated finite consequence operators {C * k | k = 2, 3, 4, . . .} such that the greatest lower bound for this set in the lattice C(L), ≤ is not a finite consequence operator. Are there simpler examples that lead to the same conclusion?
Consider a propositional language L generated by denumerably many propositional variables {P n | n ∈ IN}, and constructed in the usual manner from the unary operator ¬ and binary operator →. For the standard propositional calculus and deduction, one can use the following sets of axioms, with parentheses suppression applied. 
, k = j and assume that (P j → P 0 ), P k ⊢ n P 0 . Since the Deduction Theorem does not require any of the objects removed from the original R 3 , then this implies that ⊢ n (P j → P 0 ) → (P k → P 0 ). But, ⊢ n implies |= n , using the standard model which is not dependent upon our restriction. Hence. |= n (P j → P 0 ) → (P k → P 0 ). However, |= n (P j → P 0 ) → (P k → P 0 ). The same would result if only the wwfs P m , m ∈ IN, or only wwfs (P k → P 0 ) are members of F . Hence, there exists a unique M = max{n | ((P n → P 0 ) ∈ F ) and (P n ∈ F ) and (n ∈ IN >0 )}. But, then P 0 / ∈ C m+1 (F ). Consequently, this implies that P 0 / ∈ ( C n )(F ). Thus, {( C n )(F ) | F ∈ F (F )} = ( C n )(X) yields that C n ∈ C(L) − f (L).
For any R ⊂ R 1 (P D), always consider the standard valuations for an assignment to the propositional variables. Also, if R ⊂ R 1 (P D) and one considers the rules of reference RI R (L) = {R, R 3 (P D)}, then X ⊢ R A implies that X ⊢ P D A. Only the axioms taken from R 1 (P D) for an actual deduction of A from X are used to obtain X ⊢ P D A. Thus, for all X ∈ P(L), if X ⊢ R B, then X ⊢ P D B. Hence, if X ⊢ R A, then X |= R A for the standard valuation. Thus if ⊢ R A, then ⊢ P D , |= R A, and |= P D A. The converse holds for |= P D , but may not hold for the case |= R . However, we do have that T (R) ⊃ C R (∅).
Example 3.3.2. (P D axioms with a missing variable P 0 -not closed under ∧.) Consider a propositional L language defined by a denumerable set of variables P = {P 0 , P 1 , . . .}. Let L ′ be the propositional language generated by the set of variables P
Hence, the P 0 only appears in J m ∪ R 3 (L). Thus, no deduction using R 1 can either lead to any wwf that includes P 0 or utilize any wwf that contains P 0 . The only member of the R 1 m that is not a premises and can be used for a deduction that contains P 0 is J m . Let X = {(¬P j → ¬P 0 ), P j | j ∈ IN >0 }. Obviously, P 0 ∈ C m (X). For any deduction, the Modus Ponens (MP) rule is applied to previous steps. Let nonempty A ∈ {J n , (¬P 0 → ¬P n ), P n , P 0 | (n ∈ IN >0 ) and (n = m)}. Then ⊢ m A. For example, let A = J n . This would imply that ⊢ m J n . But, since J m = J n and there is no member of R 1 to which M P applies, then such a deduction is not possible. The same would hold for (¬P 0 → ¬P n ), P n , P 0 . Further, for j = m or k = m, ¬P 0 → ¬P j , ¬P k ⊢ m P 0 for the same reasons. We do have that P 0 ∈ C k (X) for each k ∈ IN >0 . Thus P 0 ∈ ( C k )(F ). Let nonempty F ⊂ X such that P 0 ∈ C m (F ). Then, from the above discussion,
Example 3.3.3. (Extended positive propositional deduction (P D axiom restrictions) -not closed under ∧.) Let the P D language L be generated by a denumerable set of propositional variables {P 0 , P 1 , . . .}. Let T be the set of all A ∈ L such that A is a tautology under the standard set of "truth-value" tables. The hrule is defined as follows: for each A ∈ L, let h(A) denote the wwf that results from erasing each ¬ that appears in A.
Thus, for any A ∈ R 1 , the h operator and any MP application using members of R 1 yields a tautology. This operator acts as a concrete model for deduction using members of R 1 . But for certain members of R 3 , the h-rule does not generate a tautology and these members of R 3 are, therefore, not members of C h (∅). That is, for R 1 ∪ R 2 ∪ R ′ 3 they are not RI 1 (L) theorems. The J n are wwfs that cannot be established by RI 1 (L) deduction. Let A ⊢ n B. This can always be written as J n , A ⊢ n B. Let X m = (¬P 0 → ¬P m ) and X m , P k ⊢ n P 0 , {m, n, k} ⊂ IN >0 , k = n. Since the Deduction Theorem only uses members of R 1 ∪ R 2 , then this implies that ⊢ n J n → (X m → (P k → P 0 )). This can be considered as a deduction that does not use J n as a premise. Hence, this implies that ⊢ h J n → (X m → (P k → P 0 )). However, this contradicts the h-rule. Also notice that J m = (X m → (P m → P 0 )). Hence, X m , P k ⊢ n P 0 , {m, n, k} ⊂ IN >0 , k = n implies that for any n ∈ IN >0 and A ⊂ {X m , P k | ({m, k} ⊂ IN >0 ) and (k = n)}, P 0 / ∈ C n (A). However, P 0 ∈ C n ({X n , P n }). This also shows that for n = m,
The set {i, j} = ∅. Let M = max{i, j}. It has been shown that P 0 / ∈ C M +1 (F ). Hence, from this, it follows that P 0 / ∈ {( C n )(F ) | F ∈ F (X)} = ( C n )(X) and C n ∈ C(L) − C f (L).
Potentially-Infinite.
There is yet another form of "finite" that could affect the definition of the finite consequence operator. Throughout the mathematical logic literature, different methods are employed to generate the basic collection of symbols. At the most basic stage, collections of symbols are in one-to-one correspondence with the set of natural numbers. In other cases, the symbols are in one-to-one correspondence with a potentially-infinite set of natural numbers. Then we have the case where the author only uses the notation . . . and what this means is left to the imagination. There are cases where a strong informal set theory is used and the symbols are stated as being elements of an infinite set of various cardinalities where "infinite" is that as defined by Dedekind. In this regard, the notion of "finite" often appears to be presupposed. The following is often expressed in a rather informal manner using classical logic and the stated portions of informal set theory that are similar to portions of ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel). However, various aspects are stated in terms of informal C-set theory, where C-set theory is set theory with the axiom of infinity is removed and replaced with its negation. It would be similar to (ZF − INF) + ¬INF. Of course, no results requiring an axiom of infinity are considered for C-set theory except for constructed induction. However, all the objects discussed by C-set theory are sets. It is acknowledged that concrete collections of strings of symbols can be used to demonstrated intuitive knowledge about behavior and there is common acceptance that the behavior is being displayed by such collections.
The constructed natural numbers are generated from the empty set, where due to the provable uniqueness of this set, it can be represented by writing a constant symbol ∅. The important axiomatic fact about ∅ is that, in this C-set theory, there is no set A such that A ∈ ∅. The empty set is defined as a constructed natural number. Hence, in the usual manner, beginning with ∅, which can be symbolized as 0, the set {∅} (symbolized as 1) is constructed. Under the informal C-set theory definitions, {∅} = 1 = ∅ ∪ {∅}. Using the basic definition for the operators, if n is a constructed natural number, then n ∪ {n} is a construed natural number (symbolized by n + 1, where the + is not, as yet, to be construed as a binary operator.) We add the axiom that if n is a constructed natural number and a = n, then a is a constructed natural number that cannot be differentiated from n by C-set theory. There is also a constructed induction rule for the constructed natural numbers. That is, you consider the constructed natural numbers 1, n, n + 1. (You can also start at 0 or 2, etc.) If a property P holds for 1 and assuming that P holds for n you establish that P holds for n + 1, then this means the following: "Then given a natural number k, the Intuitionist observes that in generating k by starting with 1 and passing over to k by the generation process, the property P is preserved at each step and hence holds for k" (Wilder, 1967, p. 249) . Of course, the Intuitionist does not assume classical logic.
In order for the statement a ∈ b to have meaning, a and b must be sets. Sets of constructed natural numbers exist by application of the power set axiom. We show that for a given constructed natural number n if a ∈ n, then a ⊂ n. Clearly, this statement holds if n = ∅. Assume that it holds for a constructed n. Consider the constructed n ∪ {n} and a ∈ (n ∪ {n}). Then, by definition, either a = n or a ∈ n. If a ∈ n, then from the induction hypothesis a ⊂ n. If a = n, then a ⊂ n ∪ {n}. Hence, the property that an element of a constructed natural number is also a subset of that constructed natural number is preserved. We now show that, for any constructed natural number n, if a ∈ n, then a is a constructed natural number. Clearly, the statement that "if a ∈ ∅, then a is a natural number" holds for 0. Suppose that for constructed natural number n, the statement that "if a ∈ n, then a is a constructed natural number" holds. Consider a ∈ n ∪ {n}. Then a = n or a ∈ n. If a = n, then by definition a is a constructed natural number.
On the other hand, if a ∈ n, then by the induction hypothesis, a is a constructed natural number. Thus, for a constructed natural number n if a ∈ n, then a is a constructed natural number. You also have such things as if n is a constructed natural number and a ∈ n, b ∈ a ⊂ n, then b ∈ n and b is a constructed natural number. In C-set theory, if a is a set, then you cannot write a ∈ a. Since every subset of a constructed natural number is a set of constructed natural numbers, then for n = 0, let the "interval" [1, n] be the set of all constructed natural numbers 0 = a ∈ n ∪ {n} = n + 1. As an example, consider 3. Now suppose that a ∈ 2 ∪ {2}. Then a = 2 or a ∈ 2. Thus, 2 ∈ [1, 2]. If a ∈ 2, then a = 2. Since 2 ⊂ 3 and 1 ∈ 2, then 1 ∈ 3. Hence, 1 ∈ [1, 2]. Notice that 0 ∈ 3, but 0 is excluded. Thus [1, 2] = {1, 2}. This reduction process terminates and is considered as a valid "proof" in constructive mathematics according to Brower (Wiley, 1967, p. 250) . Further, this model for [1, 2] is considered as a concrete symbolic model. Such concrete models as well as diagrams are considered as acceptable in informal proofs. We do not need to assume that the set of all such intervals exists as a set. For each constructed natural number n = 0, there exists a unique [1, n] . There are models for formal ZF, where although such correspondences exist between individual sets, there does not exist in the model an actual one-to-one correspond whose restriction leads to these individual correspondences. By direct translation of the formal theory of ZF, it is contained in the informal set theory. Set theory includes such things as the general induction principle and can be used as part of the metamathematical principles. What aspects of set theory or C-set theory that are used to establish any result can be discovered by examining specific proofs. The following is presented in a somewhat more formal way than as first described in the introduction. Conversely, suppose that X is OI. Then X = ∅. Hence, let a ∈ X. Define f = (1, a) . Then injection f : [1, 1] → X. Assume that for constructed [1, n] there exists an injection g: [1, n] → X. Since X is OI, then for constructed [1, n + 1], X − g[[1, n]] = ∅. Let b ∈ X − g [[1, n] ]. Define the injection h = g ∪ {(n + 1, b)}: [1, n + 1] → X. Hence, by constructed induction, X is CPI. Now we need an additional discussion at this point. Have I used the informal axiom of choice to establish this converse? According to Wilder (1967, p. 72) , in this case due to the language used,"There seems to be no logical way of settling this matter" (i.e. whether the axiom of choice has been used.) However, Wilder is considering an "infinite" selection processed needed to generate a function defined on the completed IN. I note that for this induction argument, only an ordinary finite set of intervals has been used at each step. Indeed, from the viewpoint of constructivism, you can only consider an ordinary finite collection of such intervals at any point and in any "proof." It is well known that even if a selection is implied by this method, then the axiom of choice is not needed for any such ordinary finite collection of non-empty sets (Jech, 1973, p. 1) . For this result to hold, a constructed induction proof is all that is needed since in each case the set under consideration is a constructed ordinary finite set of actual sets. I consider this as a logical argument that the axiom has not been used. Note that an injection using such expanding injections from the collection of all constructed intervals has not been claimed for two reasons. First, this set is not assumed to exist within this C-set theory. Second, even it did exist one cannot take the union of these denumerable many functions and claim that you have a denumerable function unless a stronger axiom is used such as the denumerable axiom of choice.
(ii) A well know result from basic formal ZF set theory, and hence informal set theory, is that a set X is Dedekind infinite if and only if it contains a denumerable subset D. In formal ZF or informal set theory, objects are sets and the constructed intervals are closed natural number intervals. Hence, for the set of natural numbers IN, there is a bijection f : IN → D. Each closed interval is a subset of IN. Thus, for any interval [1, n] , f restricted to [1, n] , satisfies the PI definition.
There is model of formal ZF that contains a set that is ordinary infinite and Dedekind finite (Jech, 1971) . Hence, OI does not imply DI using formal ZF.
(iii) In formal ZF + Denumerable Axiom of Choice, every ordinary infinite set contains a denumerable subset (Jech, 1973, p. 20) . Hence OI implies PI.
Of course, in the presence of formal ZF and the Axiom of choice, OI implies DI via an argument that uses the equivalent statement that all nonempty sets can be well-ordered.
